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CASE COMMENTS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTINGENT-FEE CONTRACT IN
DIVORCE-CONNECTED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT HELD NOT PER SE
VOID AS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
Defendant retained attorneys to represent her in a divorce and
property settlement controversy with her husband. The attorneys sued
defendant under a contract whereby she was to pay them, "as fee for
. . . negotiating and obtaining the said property settlement,":, a certain
percentage of that settlement. The court held, upon demurrer, that the
contingent-fee contract was not invalid per se. Kraus v. Naumnburg, 13
Bucks 547 (C.P. Bucks County, Pa., 1964).
Historically, all contingent-fee contracts were considered objectionable
on the ground that they tarnish the lawyer's image as a professional man
and a servant of the court by giving him a stake in the case.2 Never-
theless, most contingent-fee contracts are valid,3 because they provide a
means by which an impecunious client can obtain a lawyer.4 Although
the underlying justification applies only to impecunious clients, use of the
contingent-fee contract has extended to clients who are not of this class.
In divorce actions, however, contingent-fee contracts have generally been
held to be void as against public policy on the ground that they tend to
influence the attorney to work for the dissolution of the marriage, whereas
public policy favors reconciliation whenever possible.6
1 Instant case at 548.
2 Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 587, 588 (1940); Note,
47 IowA L. REv. 942 (1962) ; see Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535 (1857) (contingent-
fee contract void as champertous).
3 Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts, 43 B.U.L. REv. 1, 2
(1963) ; Radin, supra note 2, at 589.
4 Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 292, 61 Pac. 907, 910 (1900) (dictum);
Hughes, supra note 3, at 8; Radin, supra note 2, at 589; Note, 47 IowA L. REV.
942 (1962).
5 See Comment, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 329 (1959).
0 McCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951); Sobieski v.
Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1962); Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128 Iowa 533, 104
N.W. 904 (1905) ; Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762
(1940) ; State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W2d
459 (1960); Opperud v. Bussey, 172 Okla. 625, 46 P.2d 319 (1935); Annot., 30
A.L.R. 188 (1924); see MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 45-49
(1964). But see Krieger v. Bulpitt, 40 Cal. 2d 97, 251 P.2d 673 (1953); Kull v.
Brown, 165 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Mahoney v. Sharff, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 191, 12 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (dictum) ; note 16 infra.
A further reason for voiding contingent-fee contracts in divorce cases is based
on the presupposition that the amount of alimony the court requires the husband
to provide as support for his wife is based on the needs of the wife and is not in-
tended for the benefit of any third party. Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 180,
28 N.W. 826, 830 (1886). This consideration does not apply in the instant case,




As there is no material distinction between a contingent-fee contract
in a divorce case and that in the present case, where the property settle-
ment and the divorce action were interdependent,7 the court's holding
that the contract was not void per se rejects the established rule. The
court suggested that each case must be scrutinized "to determine whether
or not the contingent fee agreement in question is in fact contrary to
public policy." s It offered four reasons in support of this new rule.
First, a contingent-fee contract can encourage reconciliation because it
tends to influence the client to reconcile and thus avoid paying an at-
torney's fee.9 Second, since the legislature has made provision for divorce,
it cannot be against public policy to obtain one when the specified cir-
cumstances exist.'0 Third, when an attorney represents a wife without
an estate of her own, the attorney's fee is almost always in fact contingent
regardless of the form of the compensation.'1 And fourth, voiding con-
tingent-fee contracts would deprive the impecunious spouse of the services
of an attorney.' 2
The argument that a client might be influenced to effect a reconcilia-
tion by the possibility of saving the attorney's fee is unrealistic. To one
entering divorce proceedings, the attorney's fee must seem insignificant
compared with the domestic problems which gave rise to the divorce
proceedings or with other factors tending to promote reconciliation.
Furthermore, most contingent-fee cases involve the attorney for a wife
who is suing for divorce.13 Since she would pay the fee on the basis of a
net gain (alimony or property settlement) and thus acquire no out-of-
pocket expenses, it would probably not appear to her that a reconciliation
would save her money.
The court is unjustified in asserting that enactment of laws allow-
ing divorce under specified circumstances indicates that divorce is not
against public policy when those circumstances exist. While the interests
of society cannot be served by the perpetuation of a moribund marriage,14
many marriages which could legally be dissolved are not yet moribund.
7 The court stated that the property settlement was not conditioned on the
granting of a divorce, but made no attempt to show that the policy considerations
were different. If the contingent fee will tend to persuade the attorney to prevent
a reconciliation in a divorce case, it is just as likely to do so in a property settle-
ment controversy which, even though theoretically independent from the divorce,
is less likely if the divorce does not take place.
s Instant case at 554.
) Id. at 552.
1o Id. at 553.
1 Ibid.
12Ibid.
'3 See, e.g., Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900) ; McCarthy v.
Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951).
14 Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 534, 56 S.W.2d 749, 752 (1933) ; 1 NEt.soN,
DIVoRcE AND ANNULMENT § 2.02 (2d ed. 1945).
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In the latter cases public policy urges reconciliation,'5 and the lawyer's
self-interest, generated -by a contingent-fee contract, conflicts with the
interests of society.' 6
The court is naive in suggesting case-by-case determination of whether
the contingent-fee contract in question is in fact contrary to public policy.'
7
It seems to expect the client resisting enforcement of such a contract to
make the argument in court that the divorce he or she has just obtained
should not, and absent the lawyer's actions would not, have come about.
The probabilities of someone making that argument seem minimal.
In endorsing a case-by-case determination, the court may have meant
either that contingent fees will be permitted in divorce cases only when
the marriage in question is clearly unsalvable, or that they will be per-
mitted only where it is ascertained that the attorney did not work for
dissolution of the marriage.
Blanket voidance of contingent-fee contracts attains the desired end
-deterring lawyers from working against the marriage-more effectively
than either case-by-case approach. If blanket voidance is the rule, the
lawyer knows that any contingent-fee contract he makes will be unenforce-
able.' 8 The case-by-case approach, on the other hand, involves problems
15 Radin, supra note 2, at 590; see 1 FREEDMAN, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA § 5, at 9 (2d ed. 1957) ; 1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2.02. "The
family unit is an indispensable factor in the growth of an orderly and civilized
society." Miner, Conciliation Rather Than Reconciliation, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 464, 468
(1948).
16 This analysis does not require that every contingent-fee contract in a divorce
setting be invalidated. For instance, the spouse defending a divorce action might
agree with his or her attorney to a fee contingent on the avoidance of a divorce
or a fee inversely related in size to the amount of property the client is forced to
give up. Such a contract would not tend to induce the lawyer to work for the
dissolution of the marriage and should therefore be permissible. On the other hand,
the fact that the client is nominally defending against a divorce is insufficient to
warrant the use of a fee, like that in Krieger v. Bulpitt, 40 Cal. 2d 97, 251 P.2d 673
(1953), contingent on the amount of property to be received by the client as a
result of the divorce. Such a contract will have just as strong an influence on the
lawyer to work for dissolution as a similar contract with the spouse who is actually
suing for the divorce and similarly should be void.
17 This court receives support for its theory of case-by-case determination from
Krieger v. Bulpitt, supra note 16. In that case the plaintiff attorney had repre-
sented a husband defending in a divorce action. In Mahoney v. Sharff, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 191, 12 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), the court in dictum cited
Krieger for the proposition that "under certain circumstances where a divorce action
is pending a plaintiff wife may legally enter into a contingent fee contract with an
attorney who is to represent her in that proceeding." Id. at 194, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
Krieger depended to a large extent upon Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417
(1943). In Hill, however, the contract in question was a property settlement be-
tween a husband and wife. The general rule in such cases is to look at the agree-
ment to see if it promoted or facilitated the divorce. See, e.g., Hoy's Estate, 308
Pa. 131, 162 Atl. 155 (1932) ; Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 Atl. 236 (1925).
It is one thing for a husband and wife to realize that their marriage is dead and
make appropriate arrangements. It is quite another for a third party to be placed
in a position in which a premium is placed upon his working for the dissolution of
what may be a salvable marriage.
18 The rationale of the blanket voidance rule is similar to that which prohibits
a trustee from selling trust property to himself, regardless of the lack of fraud or
the fairness of the price, unless all beneficiaries consent. The fear is that the con-
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of proof, whether the inquiry be directed to salvability or actual conduct.
It would be both difficult and socially undesirable to attempt to prove in
court that a marriage was or was not unsalvable.19 Inquiry into the
attorney's actual conduct may be even more futile, since he could probably
work for dissolution of the marriage without his client being aware of it.
Even if the client were conscious of the attorney's efforts toward dissolu-
tion, the latter's actions might be too subtle to be conducive to proof in
a court.
Because it removes the source of the temptation, blanket voidance is
likely to have a beneficial effect on the conduct even of the lawyer who
wishes to be strictly ethical. If contingent-fee contracts are permitted
where the marriage is unsalvable, the lawyer asked to represent a spouse
on a contingent-fee basis might unconsciously stretch to find the marriage
unsalvable. 20 Once he had made such a finding, he would justifiably
feel that there was no reason to be careful not to work against the mar-
riage. Even if the lawyer is prohibited only from working for dissolution,
the temptation of the contingent fee remains and may overcome his
inclination to be ethical.
Further problems are evident if the court is to inquire into the
attorney's actual conduct, because the courts have indicated that the only
conduct to be censured is working for dissolution.21 Even if the court
finds that the lawyer has not worked for dissolution, the contingent fee
may still have had the undesirable effect of deterring him from affirmatively
working for reconciliation. A primary responsibility of the attorney is to
work for the best interests of his client. Since reconciliation may well be
to the interest of the client, whether he is aware of it or not, a lawyer's
failure to explore actively with his client the possibilities for reconciliation
tingent fee, or the opportunity to make a profit by the sale, will tempt the lawyer
or the trustee to behave in his own interest, but contrary to the interest of those
whom he has a duty to serve. In both cases the object is to prevent publicly-
condemned behavior by prohibiting the party from enjoying any benefit from the
act which has within it the seeds of that behavior. See Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 503, 557 (1846). "It is the duty of a trustee to administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. He is not permitted to place himself in
a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the bene-
ficiaries." 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 170, at 1193 (2d ed. 1956).
19 A spouse should not be subjected to the emotionally disturbing experience of
reviewing his or her domestic problems in open court any more than is necessary.
20 If he takes the case on a flat fee, his conclusion that the marriage is un-
salvable and that it is against the interest of his client to reconcile will be a con-
clusion not tempered by his self-interest, but rather based on his objective appraisal
of the marriage. In such instances it is his duty so to advise his client. ABA,
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETiICS AND GRIEVANcES No. 82,
at 192 (1957) ; note 22 infra.
21 See note 6 supra. This rule could be an application of the general reluctance
to find a duty for a party to act if that party has not caused the peril, see 2 HARPER
& JAmES, TORTS § 18.6, at 1046 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 54, at 334 (3d ed. 1964),
or it could be the result of reluctance to try to require a lawyer to do that which
in many cases he is not prepared to do.
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should be considered improper.22 Even if the courts looked for failure to
fulfill this ethical responsibility, they would be unable to distinguish lip
service from sincere effort.
Finally, in some jurisdictions the lawyer who enters into a prohibited
contingent-fee agreement is subject to disciplinary action by the local bar
association for unethical conduct m3 If all contingent-fee agreements are
prohibited, violation of the ethical standard will be comparatively easy
to detect, for only the existence of the contract need come to the attention
of the bar association in order for the breach of ethics to be evident. If
the courts determine validity on the basis of a case-by-case examination,
cognizance by the bar association of the existence of a contingent-fee
contract will not lead it to conclude that the lawyer was engaged in any
improper activity, because the contract is not on its face inconsistent with
ethical conduct. The bar association, therefore, probably will not initiate
disciplinary proceedings unless additional, hard-to-uncover information
comes to its attention. Furthermore, the same problems of proof which
confront a court attempting to determine the validity of the contract
22 See ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES No. 82, at 192 (1957):
An attorney is obligated to advise his client as to the best interests of
the client as seen by the attorney. In many divorce cases the best interests
of both parties will be promoted by a reconciliation; but in other cases the
best interests of one or the other or even of both parties will be promoted
by the divorce. If the attorney honestly believed that the best interests of
his client would be prejudiced by a reconciliation, it was, in the opinion of
the committee, entirely proper for him to advise his client to that effect.
Commentators have made explicit the apparent implication of this opinion. See
Cunningham, The Lawyer as a Family Counselor: As the Judge Sees Him, 22 U.
KAN. CITY L. REv. 45 (1953); Kargman, The Lawyer as Divorce Counselor, 46
A.B.A.J. 399 (1960) ; Zacher, The Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer in
Divorce, 27 Mo. L. REv. 466 (1962); Note, The Role of the Lawyer iu Divorce,
21 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 720 (1960).
"During the last century, liability for 'nonfeasance' has been extended still
further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment and views
of social policy have led the courts to find a duty of affirmative action. It is not
likely that this process of extension has ended." PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 21,
at 335.
23 One court has upheld disciplinary action against a lawyer who made a con-
tingent-fee contract which was against public policy on the general ground that
the execution of such an agreement is a breach of professional obligation. State
ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Dunker, 160 Neb. 779, 784, 71 N.W.2d 502, 506
(1955). Another court said disciplinary action could be based on Canon 13 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which provides that "a contract for a
contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circum-
stances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court as to its reasonableness."
The court reasoned that this canon "countenances contingent fee contracts only when
they are sanctioned by law. A contingent fee contract which contravenes public
policy and is for that reason void is not sanctioned by law. It is therefore a viola-
tion of the ethics of the profession for an attorney to enter into such a contract."
In re Smith, 42 Wash. 2d 188, 197, 254 P.2d 464, 469 (1953). Since the case was
one of first impression, the court declined to discipline the attorney.
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confront the bar association in the disciplinary proceeding. Finally, if
the salvability of the marriage is the test, the attorney has available the
defense that he thought the marriage to be unsalvable, and that any error
was simply a mistake of judgment, not a breach of ethics.24
The court also asserted that if the wife has no estate of her own, the
agreement for compensation will be contingent in the last analysis, no
matter what form it takes. What the court failed to recognize is that this
contingency is less likely to influence the lawyer to work for the dissolution
of the marriage. Under a contingent-fee contract the lawyer's fee is
dependent upon his client's obtaining a divorce. His self-interest, there-
fore, is tied to' obtaining the divorce and produces the tendency in him
to work for the dissolution of the marriage. On the other hand, under a
flat fee arrangement the lawyer is still legally entitled to his fee even
when no divorce is obtained, and he stands a chance of obtaining it. If
failure to obtain the divorce was due to reconciliation, the husband would
probably feel a moral, if not legal, obligation to pay the attorney, especially
if the attorney aided in the reconciliation. Consequently, the incentive to
work for divorce will not be so strong, and the lawyer will be less
inhibited in working for reconciliation.
Finally, the court argued that the contingent fee supplies the only
means by which an impecunious person can obtain a lawyer. This argu-
ment applies only when the client's spouse has almost all the money in
the family, since the contingent-fee arrangement would be unnecessary
if both spouses had money and would be useless if both were impecunious.
Many states, however, have statutes which provide for payment of lawyers
representing wives in divorce actions.25 These counsel fees include
remuneration for services rendered in negotiating a property settlement.26
While the statutes make no provision for the attorney who takes a divorce
24 There is one instance when an exception to the rule of blanket voidance
could be made. An attorney could be allowed to take a divorce case on a con-
tingent-fee basis if he has a certificate from a social agency that a divorce would
be socially useful. A lawyer-social agency relationship could conceivably be estab-
lished in which the social agency would interview potential divorcees, explore the
possibilities of reconciliation, and in appropriate cases issue the certificate. The social
agency would be certified by the state to make such decisions. Since the reason
for using the social agency would be simply to put the decision on salvability in
the hands of a disinterested party, there would be no reason to have review of the
agency's findings.
2 5 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (1955).
These statutes allow the court to require the husband to pay counsel fees and costs
of the wife. They do not generally work in the other direction and help the im-
pecunious husband. But see CAL. CIrv. CoDE § 137.3. When there is no statute
enabling the husband to obtain counsel fees from his wife, and in addition there
is no Legal Aid Society which will represent the husband, he should be allowed,
if financially unable to retain an attorney on a flat fee, to retain him on a contingent-
fee basis. This situation is rare as it assumes both that the husband cannot afford an
attorney, and that the wife has money which the husband will get as a result of
the divorce. See generally Comment, 20 OHio ST. LJ. 329 (1959).
26 See Chambers v. Chambers, 188 Pa. Super. 506, 149 A.2d 532 (1959).
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case but reconciles the parties before the action is filed, the lawyer in such
a situation could probably recover for his services from the reconciled
couple.
2 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES
QUALIFIED PRIV'ILEGE To PUBLISH DEFAMATORY MISSTATEMENTS
ABOUT PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Petitioner newspaper printed a political advertisement paid for by an
integrationist group. Since the group was headed by a figure of apparent
respectability and since the advertisement contained no criticism of any
individual, the newspaper did not verify the statements in the advertise-
ment. In fact the advertisement contained several untrue statements al-
legedly concerning Montgomery, Alabama, police. Respondent, Mont-
gomery's police commissioner, brought a civil libel action against petitioner
in Alabama. The trial judge refused to charge the jury that recovery must
be based on a showing of actual malice. The jury awarded respondent
$500,000. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.1 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding, inter alia, that a public official
may not constitutionally recover damages for a false and defamatory state-
ment about his public conduct unless he shows that the statement was
motivated by actual malice. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
The present decision is the first in which the Supreme Court has found
in constitutional free speech guarantees a limitation on state civil libel law.
2
State law generally recognizes a right to make public "fair comment" on
27 Although this is not the case in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, another means
generally available to an impecunious spouse for obtaining an attorney is the Legal
Aid Society. Legal Aid, generally unavailable in personal injury cases, because other
attorneys can take them on a contingent-fee basis, is available to a spouse who
cannot otherwise afford a lawyer. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE, UNITED STATES
72, 75 (1951).
In the District of Columbia, whenever a staff attorney of the Legal Aid Society
is representing the husband or wife in any domestic relations litigation, it is his
duty "to lend his best efforts to bring about a reconciliation, or to conciliate the
differences between the parties." Should We Attempt Marriage Counseling?, 22
LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 206, 209 (1964). In some localities Legal Aid will only
take a divorce case when there exists a "social need for divorce." Gardiner, What
About Divorce?, 14 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 63, 64 (1956).
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
2In Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 342 (1942),
affirming mem. by an equally divided court 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), the lack
of a Supreme Court opinion left open the question of the constitutionality of the
court of appeals' holding, 122 F.2d at 290, that a false and defamatory statement
about the political motivation of a Congressman was actionable. Howard v. Lyons,
360 U.S. 593 (1959), dealing with the absolute privilege of federal officials to
publish defamatory statements in the course of their duties, did not turn on first
amendment issues. Farmer's Educ. & Co-op. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.,
360 U.S. 525 (1959), concerned a question of the supremacy of a federal statute
over state civil libel law. This exhausts the list of decisions in which the Supreme
Court has heard an appeal from a civil libel action brought under state law.
CASE COMMENTS
matters of legitimate interest to the community. 3 This right consists of an
immunity for publication in good faith of otherwise actionable expressions
of opinion based upon true or privileged statements of fact. The im-
munity is not defeated if conclusions are unreasonably deduced from their
premises, but comments may not bear so little relevance to the stated facts
as to imply the existence of unstated defamatory facts. 4 Included among
the matters to which the fair comment privilege applies are the conduct of
public officials, the qualifications of candidates for public office, and the
management of schools, charities, and business enterprises vital to the
public welfare, as well as artistic, scientific, and athletic exhibitions intended
for public consumption. 5
Until the present decision, American courts were divided on the ques-
tion whether the immunity protecting fair comment on the conduct of public
officials and the qualifications of candidates for public office should be sup-
plemented by a qualified privilege to make false and defamatory statements
of fact about them.6 A majority of jurisdictions refused to recognize such
a privilege. Their refusal has been grounded on the belief that harm to
the reputations of public men permitted by establishment of the qualified
privilege rule outweighed the value to the community of the additional in-
formation about public affairs produced by the privilege. 7 Many courts
in majority jurisdictions have also echoed the fear of Judge (later Chief
Justice) Taft that the privilege rule might permit damage to reputation
great enough to deter worthy men from seeking public office.s The minority
jurisdictions, however, concluded that the interest of the community in free
discussion of public issues requires a qualified privilege to publish false
and defamatory statements of fact about public officials.9 It is such a rule
which the Court's present opinion holds required by the Constitution.'0
3 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 5.28 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 110, at 812-16
(3d ed. 1964); 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-07 (1938); Hallen, Fair Comment,
8 TEXAS L. REv. 41 (1929).
4 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606(1), comment c (1938).
5 Authorities cited note 3 supra.
6 1 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, § 5.26, at 449-50; PROSSER, op. Cit.
supra note 3, § 110, at 814; Hallen, supra note 3, at 62-70; Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 875, 896-97 (1949).
7 E.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 539-41 (6th Cir. 1893);
Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 581-85, 64 N.E.2d 751,
761-63 (1946) ; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242-44, 28 N.E. 1,
4 (1891).
s Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, supra note 7, at 540.
9 See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 730-40, 98 Pac. 281, 286-91
(1908). See also authorities cited note 6 supra.
10 Some minority jurisdiction cases say that a lack of due care on the defendant's
part is sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege to make a defamatory misstate-
ment about a public official. Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 72-73, 121 Ati. 92,
95-96 (1923); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 713, 743, 98 Pac. 281, 282, 292
(1908) (dictum); Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. 406, 416, 25 Atl. 613,
616-17 (1893) (dictum); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 303-07,
27 S.E.2d 837, 843-44 (1943) (dictum). The instant case, however, holds that
negligence does not defeat the constitutionally required privilege. Instant case at 288.
As the Lafferty and Jackson cases indicate, New Hampshire's and Pennsyl-
vania's conditional privilege depends on the defendant's showing of reasonable
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Any assessment of the implications of the present decision must derive
in part from an examination of the argument used by the Court to arrive
at the present holding. That argument is bottomed on the proposition that
the first amendment was designed to protect and promote uninhibited debate
on public issues."- From the language used in its lengthy exposition 1
2 of
this proposition, it is clear that the Court's concern was not with the first
amendment's protection of free speech generally. Rather the opinion
focuses on an interest in "public discussion" 13 and "free political discus-
sion" about "government," "public questions," "public institutions," 14 and
"public characters," 15 all for the purpose of "bringing about political and
social changes desired by the people," and so "that government may be
responsive to the will of the people." 16 It is an interest thus described which
the Court finds constitutionally protected despite the interest of public
officials in their reputations.
Language of the present opinion is not the sole source of authority
to which courts may turn for guidance in seeking to apply the present
holding to future cases. Precedents in the jurisdictions that have estab-
grounds of belief and a proper motive. In Pennsylvania the defense also fails if
the tone and format of the publication are not proper. O'Donnell v. Philadelphia
Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 315-16, 51 A.2d 775, 778-79, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766
(1947); Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa. 420, 64 Atl. 636 (1907). All
these requirements put potential defendants in a significantly less advantageous posi-
tion than the rule of the instant case and might well be held to be an unconsti-
tutional inhibition of debate on public issues.
The posture of Pennsylvania's libel law has been further complicated by a
statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1583 (1953), passed after the Jackson case:
In all civil actions for libel, no damages shall be recovered unless it is
established to the satisfaction of the jury, under the direction of the court as
in other cases, that the publication has been maliciously or negligently made,
but where malice or negligence appears such damage may be awarded as
the jury shall deem proper.
This statute might be read to mean that the malice required to establish liability is
no different from that required to overcome a qualified privilege. But direct refer-
ences to the statute in Pennsylvania cases are unenlightening on this point. See
Reagan v. O'Toole, 348 Pa. 364, 368, 35 A.2d 55, 57 (1944); Wharen v. Dershuck,
264 Pa. 562, 566-68, 108 Atl. 18, 19-20 (1919) (per curiam); Clark v. North Am.
Co., 203 Pa. 346, 354, 53 Atl. 237, 239 (1902); Binder v. Pottstown Daily News
Publishing Co., 33 Pa. Super. 411, 428 (1907). Moreover, recent Pennsylvania
cases seem to indicate that the qualified privilege to make statements about matters
of public concern exists apart from the statute. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bulletin Co.,
369 Pa. 353-54, 85 A.2d 869, 872 (1952).
In Missouri there is no qualified privilege for the publication of a defamatory
misstatement of fact. But in an action based on an alleged defamatory statement
about a public official, the court held recovery would be defeated unless the plain-
tiff proved falsity. Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, 183 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Mo. 1944).
This is a shift from the normal requirement in libel actions that the defendant
must carry the burden of proving truth. It is conceivable that the instant case
might be read not to require a qualified privilege in a jurisdiction applying the rule
of the Kleinschmidt case. See instant case at 279.
11 Id. at 269.
12 Id. at 269-76.
I1 Id. at 270.
14 Id. at 269.
15 Id. at 274.
16 Id. at 269.
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lished qualified privilege for substantially the same reasons advanced by
the Court in the present opinion will be relevant in determining the state-
ments to which the constitutional privilege applies. It is virtually certain
that the immunity will include statements about politically appointed 1
as well as elected officials and statements about legislators,'8 judges, 9 and
officials charged with executive duties. Opinions in minority jurisdictions
indicate that statements about officials, like a justice of the peace 2o or a
village clerk,21 whose exercise of power is restricted to very small com-
munities, are also privileged, and nothing in the present opinion suggests
that the size of the public concerned is relevant to the need for uninhibited
debate.
It is almost equally certain that the constitutional requirement of
privilege will be extended to protect nonmalicious falsehoods about can-
didates for public office.22 Indeed the present opinion's emphasis on the
first amendment's protection of uninhibited debate as a means of bringing
about constructive political and social change 2 applies with special force
when society is to choose new men to govern it. In all jurisdictions where
a qualified privilege protects statements about public officers, the same
protection extends to statements made about candidates for public office, 24
and the present decision alludes to the "candidate" rule with apparent
approval.25
Less certain is whether the present opinion requires that a qualified
privilege protect statements about every person employed by the govern-
ment. In a strictly literal sense, the occupant of any government post is a
public official, and minority jurisdictions have rarely questioned the as-
sumption that the term "public official" or "public officer" comprehends any
11 Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921) (police
chief appointed and removable by mayor).
18 Kramer v. Ferguson, 40 Cal. Rptr. 321, 324-25 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); cf.
Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 9-10, 277 N.W. 264, 269 (1938) (state-
ment made about a candidate for city council).
19 Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 185 Kan. 61, 340 P.2d 396 (1959); cf.
instant case at 273 (dictum). An attorney, though an "officer of the court," is prob-
ably not a public official for purposes of conditional privilege. See Sowers v.
Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 633-36, 95 P.2d 281, 283-85 (1939).
20 Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa. 470, 64 Atl. 636 (1906) (dictum).
2 1Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 115 N.W.2d 259, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 862 (1962).
22The suggestion is made in dictum in Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 Instant case at 269-72.
2 4 Noel, supra note 6, at 898. On the basis of a comparison of Bailey v.
Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 305, 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (1943) (charge that
public official misapplied state funds held qualifiedly privileged), with Sweeney v.
Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 183-84 (1878) (no qualified privilege for statements about
candidate for office), Noel claims that West Virginia is an exception to the state-
ment in the text. But, since his article was published, the decision in England v.
Daily Gazette Publishing Co., 143 W. Va. 700, 711, 104 S.E.2d 306, 312-13 (1958)
(qualified privilege held inapplicable to charge that state legislator sold his vote),
has thrown doubt on whether the Bailey case actually signaled adoption of the
minority rule with regard to public officials.
2 5 Instant case at 280-82.
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government employee for purposes of the privilege rule.20  Statements
about a policeman 27 and an investigator in a district attorney's office 28
have been said to be conditionally immune. Moreover, it is generally held
that communications by a government employee are at least qualifiedly
privileged,29 and the existence of privileges for such statements, according
to the present opinion, is an important reason for establishing a cor-
responding immunity for citizens' statements about officials. 30 This au-
thority and reasoning may prove persuasive in future cases, but the
rationale of the present opinion requires only that qualified privilege extend
to a contribution to debate on "public issues" designed to bring about
"political and social changes desired by the people." The Court's language,
in other words, calls for application of the immunity only to statements
about officials powerful 3l enough to affect affairs which may properly be
labeled "political" or "social." Thus the damage to the reputation of
a minor government employee, which extension of qualified privilege might
permit, is not justified by enhancement of that interest which the Court
says the first amendment protects.
An extremely uncertain question is whether the qualified privilege
rule will be extended to statements made about individuals or groups other
than officials or candidates. With the exception of a few holdings in a few
states,32 all the cases in minority jurisdictions have extended that privilege
only to statements about officials and candidates. 33 Moreover, the Court's
own discussion of the privilege issue contains no direct reference to state-
ments about persons neither officials nor candidates. But there is a strong
26But cf. Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 225, 230-31 (N.D. Idaho 1944), sug-
gesting that a newspaper article about a postmaster, whom the court assumed to be
under civil service, should not be protected even by the fair comment immunity.
27 Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 At. 92 (1923) (dictum).
28 Jones v. Express Publishing Co., 87 Cal. App. 246, 258-59, 262 Pac. 78, 84
(Dist. Ct. App. 1927); cf. Dempsky v. Double, 386 Pa. 543, 547-48, 126 A.2d 915,
917-18 (1956) (publication to League of Women Voters of charges against auto-
mobile mechanic employed by county).
29 1 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, § 5.23, at 429-30; PROSSER, Op. Cit.
supra note 3, § 109, at 802-04; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 591 (1938).
30 Instant case at 282.
31 Such power is indicated by authority to hire, discharge, and promote large
numbers of personnel, to disburse large amounts of public funds, to make findings
of fact on which valuable interests depend, or to direct the conduct of any con-
siderable number of men employing force on behalf of the state.
32 See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
33 Jurisdictions which formerly held statements about officials and candidates not
privileged refused a fortiori to establish conditional immunity to make public mis-
statements about other persons. See, e.g., State Press Co. v. Willett, 219 Ark. 850,
245 S.W.2d 403 (1952) (minister who broadcast sermons on radio); Hubbard v.
Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 168-70, 86 N.E. 356, 358 (1908) (town baker); Marr v.
Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 34, 246 P.2d 509, 523-24 (1952) (radio repair service); Bell
Publishing Co. v. Garrett Eng'r Co., 141 Tex. 51, 61-64, 170 S.W.2d 197, 204
(1943) (engineering firm under contract with municipality); PROSSER, op. Cit. supra
note 3, § 110, at 814 n.80. One court seems to have held to the contrary without
stating any reasons for conferring the privilege. Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985,
999, 1002-03, 144 S.E. 624, 628, 145 S.E. 731 (1928).
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argument arising out of the present opinion for such extension to state-
ments about certain individuals other than officials and candidates. The
Court holds that the Constitution requires exposure of the reputations of
public officials to public defamatory misstatements because orderly change
in a democratic society depends on uninhibited debate on public issues.
Implicit in this proposition is the idea that public officials, like the respond-
ent city commissioner, are in such positions of power that they, far more
than the average citizen, significantly influence community affairs. Modern
inquiries into the functioning of American society indicate, however, that
the process of contemporary social development is as much affected by
political parties, large corporations, labor unions, and lobbying groups as it
is by government.34  A corollary is that individuals who set the policies
of such organizations possess as much ability to influence community con-
cerns as do occupants of responsible government posts. It follows that an
interest in public discussion protected by the first amendment requires a
qualified privilege to make public defamatory misstatements about such
nonofficial persons and about the organizations they lead just as much as
it requires privilege for misstatements about officials and candidates.
35
Authority for this extension of the rule may be found in a few minority
jurisdiction cases 36 and in dictum in Colemnan v. MacLennan,
3 7 a leading
case holding privileged statements about a candidate for public office:
34 See, e.g., KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 13-14, 22-23 (4th
ed. 1958) ; TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 46-47, 501-03 passin (1951).
35 Under existing libel law, publication of some false and defamatory state-
ments about such nonofficial individuals may be conditionally immune because of
the privilege to make a fair report. This privilege attaches to the accurate repro-
duction of statements, or of the substance of statements, made at a proceeding,
official or unofficial, in which the public has a legitimate interest. E.g., Barrows
v. Bell, 73 Mass. 301, 309-16 (1856); 1 HARPER & JAMES, op. Cit. supra note 3,
§ 5.24, at 431-32.
36 Crane v. Waters, 10 Fed. 619, 621 (D. Mass. 1882) (statement charging
financier with plans to bankrupt major railroad); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver
City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 617, 116 A.2d 440, 445-46 (1955) (statement made
during election campaign that plaintiff corporation was about to go out of busi-
ness); Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 542-43, 34 Atl. 411, 413 (1896) (statement
charging contractor with improprieties in work on a public building); McLean v.
Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920) (charge against campaign manager
during election campaign) ; Morgan v. Bulletin Co., 369 Pa. 349, 353-54, 85 A.2d 869,
872 (1952) (dictum) (charges that businesswoman seeking parking meter contract
with municipality bribed officials); O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 356 Pa.
307, 313-16, 51 A.2d 775, 778-79 (dictum), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947)
(statement imputing pro-Nazi sentiments to the Washington columnist of a major
newspaper chain).
Bearce v. Bass, supra, has, however, been seriously questioned by Pattangall v.
Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 418-19, 94 AtI. 561, 564 (1915). In Charles Parker Co. v.
Silver City Crystal Co., supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors cited five
cases in support of its holding. Of these, two cases, Flanagan v. Nicholson Pub-
lishing Co., 137 La. 588, 599, 68 So. 964, 968 (1915), and South Hetton Coal Co. v.
Northeastern News Ass'n [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 143, dealt with fair comment. Tilles v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 609, 636, 145 S.W. 1143, 1152-54 (1912), con-
cerned the totally distinct qualified privilege to make public a fair report of a
governmental publication already privileged by virtue of the source which issued it.
The other two cases cited were Bearce v. Bass, supra, and Crane v. Waters, supra.
3778 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908). The instant case cites Coleman with ap-
proval and at length. Instant case at 280-82.
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[I]t must be borne in mind that the correct rule, whatever it is,
must govern in cases other than those involving candidates for
office. It must apply to all officers and agents of government-
municipal, state and national; to the management of all public in-
stitutions--educational, charitable and penal; to the conduct of all
corporate enterprises affected with a public interest-transporta-
tion, banking, insurance, and to innumerable other subjects in-
volving the public welfare.
38
One minority jurisdiction opinion, however, has gone beyond this view
and held privileged a statement made about the manager of a heavyweight
boxing champion on the basis of its interest to the public.3 9 The present
decision, however, does not contain language from which the constitutional
requirement of qualified privilege may be inferred to extend to publications
about such persons as sports figures,40 entertainers, artists, and writers.
The common acceptation of the key terms "public men," "public institu-
tions," and "public issues," by which the Court describes the constitu-
tionally-protected interest which the qualified privilege promotes, limits the
constitutional requirement of that rule to statements made about political
and economic activities which materially affect the public welfare.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRANsFusioNs ORDFEED For DYING
WOMAN Ovw REiGious OBJECTIONS
Respondent, a Jehovah's Witness and mother of a seven-month-old
child, willingly entered the hospital suffering from severe internal hemor-
rhaging. Believing that only immediate blood transfusions could save her
life, the hospital officials sought court authorization to administer them over
the religious objections of respondent and her husband.1 After the applica-
38 78 Kan. at 734-35, 98 Pac. at 289.
3 9 Bocchiccio v. Curtis Publishing Co., 203 F. Supp. 403, 411 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
4o Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(qualified privilege not required by instant case to extend to statements that a
heavyweight title fighter had plaster of paris in his gloves in a championship bout
forty-five years ago); cf. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 534-35
(Sup. Ct. 1964). Prior to the instant case doubt as to the proper doctrine was ex-
pressed in Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 872-73
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3129 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1964) (statement that
major league baseball player failed to get along with teammates). The Cepeda case
was decided under California law, which extended the qualified privilege to statements
about public officials and candidates. See note 17 supra.
1 Jehovah's Witnesses interpret portions of the Old Testament as forbidding
them to eat or introduce into their bodies any human or animal blood. See WATCH
TowER BIrL & TRACT SOCIETY, BLOOD, MEDICINE AND THE LAw OF GOD (1961);
How, Religion, Medicine and Law, 3 CAN. B.J. 365 (1960). It might be that
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tion was denied by the federal district court, it was presented to a judge on
the court of appeals, who held an informal hearing at the hospital. Although
respondent's only statement was "against my will," 2 and her husband re-
fused to give permission, the hospital was quickly granted authority to
administer transfusions "necessary to save her life." 3 Application of the
President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, rehear-
ing denied per curiam, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
Owing to the consensual nature of the doctor-patient relationship, any
treatment, even if beneficial, has been found to be a battery if administered
respondent and her husband were amenable to the transfusions so long as they were
authorized by court order and not by their consent. See instant case at 1007. But
see Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964); Erickson v. Dilgard, No. 11974/62, Sup. Ct. Nassau County, N.Y.,
Oct. 1, 1962.
2 Instant case at 1007.
3A detailed discussion of the procedural aspects of the case is beyond the scope
of this comment. However, some of the problems should be noted.
The emergency nature of the situation afforded the judge little time to consider
procedural bases for his action. His opinion was not filed until almost five months
after the order was granted.
In order to justify granting the order at the appellate level, the judge viewed
the application to the district court as a complaint under FFD. R. CIV. P. 8(a) and
(f), which allow pleadings irregular in form provided they perform the complaint's
function and give grounds for jurisdiction and relief. Its denial was considered a
determination on the merits. Acting without the statutory requirement of a
quorum, see 28 U.S.C. §§46(b)-(d) (1958), the judge based his authority on the
All Writs Act of the Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958), which gives federal
judges the power to grant "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of the law," and
justified it on the theory of maintaining the status quo in order to preserve the
court's jurisdiction. However, it is difficult to see how granting the order preserved
the status quo. The implementation of the order was precisely the relief sought
on the merits, and the circumstances seem to have been such as to moot the ques-
tion immediately upon its implementation. Probably recognizing the finality of such
an order, the judge then discussed at length the merits of the situation, despite the
fact that the order ostensibly went only to the preserving of jurisdiction.
The requisite case and controversy were found in the hospitaFs risk of civil
and criminal liability by withholding the transfusions. But it would appear that
obtaining a waiver from the respondent would have released the hospital from
civil liability by terminating or limiting the parties' contract. See, e.g., Dashell v.
Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 At. 1094 (1896); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d
208 (1937). As to criminal liability of the doctor, the law is unclear. Courts
have upheld manslaughter convictions where a legal duty of care existed. See
Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962); State v. Hardister, 38 Ark.
605 (1882). But cf. State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259, 93 Pac. 414 (1908). How-
ever, it is generally stated that a doctor's obligation cannot go beyond the consent,
express or implied, of the patient. See Dashell v. Griffith, supra; Ricks v. Budge,
supra; note 4 infra and accompanying text. No cases seem to have dealt with
the situation where a competent patient refused consent to treatment and death
resulted. Regardless of whether the doctor would, in such a case, be criminally
liable, it is questionable whether an action to avoid possible future criminal lia-
bility provides the requisite case or controversy. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961).
For a more thorough treatment of the procedural aspects of the case, see 77
HARv. L. R-v. 1539 (1964) ; 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 706 (1964).
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without consent.4 "[U]nder a free government . . . the free citizen's
first and greatest right, which underlies all others [is] . . . the right to
the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself . . . . " 5
Because the decision is in the hands of the individual, medical authorities
have no general right to force treatment upon him, even if known to be in
his best interests. 6
The present case presents a conflict between the humanitarian and
moral interest in preserving life and the law's evolving concern with the
individual's religious freedom. One manifestation of this evolution has
been the tendency toward a broader interpretation of what is or is not a
religion. 7 There has been a corresponding increase in the courts' willing-
ness to allow activities as being within the free exercise of religion which
might otherwise be proscribed under the police power.8 Unless it can be
said that freedom of person and religion does not extend to the refusal of
efforts to save one's life,9 some "compelling interest" 10 must be found on
4 See, e.g., Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955); Barnett v.
Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Ct. Munic. App. 1943); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300,
79 N.E. 562 (1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905);
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) ; Rollater v.
Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).
5 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166, aff'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906);
see Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., supra note 4.6 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). The occasional excep-
tions to the requirement of consent involve emergency situations where obtaining
consent is difficult or impossible and are decided on a theory of "implied consent."
See McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929); Sullivan v. Montgomery,
155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935). Such a theory could not apply where, as
in the instant case, consent was specifically withheld.
7 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (whether a belief is religious
depends upon the sincerity with which it is held, not its reasonableness). Compare
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. R. 290, 295, 5 Am. Dec. 335, 337 (N.Y. 1811) : "[W]e
are a [C]hristian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon
[C]hristianity, and not upon the doctrines of worship of those [e.g., Mohammedan]
imposters," (quoted with approval in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1892)), with Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1961) (Black Islam is a religion).
8 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (wartime bell-ringing
statute designed to accommodate night defense workers held unconstitutional as
applied to Jehovah's Witnesses distributing literature); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S.
103 (1943), reversing 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (license tax upon sale of literature uncon-
stitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (offensive remarks about Christian beliefs protected as religious exer-
cise); People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (statute
forbidding use of narcotic-like peyote unconstitutional as applied to religious cere-
mony) ; In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963), following remand of 375 U.S.
14 (per curiam), vacating 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963) (refusal to serve
on jury under religious objection to judging others).
9 Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (federal statutory prohi-
bition of polygamy constitutional). "[I]f a wife religiously believed it was her duty
to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?"
Id. at 166 (dictum).
10 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ; People v. Woody, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 820 (1964).
Clearly, such a compelling interest would exist where the actor's conduct en-
dangered others. See, e.g., "the snake cases": Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88
So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 697, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956); Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d
409 (1947).
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the part of the state to justify the court's interference with respondent's
choice in the present case.
One such interest might be derived from the doctrine of patens
patriae-the sovereign power of guardianship over minors and incom-
petents-which allows the court to intercede when parents or guardians
are remiss in their duty of care. Most states faced with the question of
whether medical treatment of a child can be given over the parents' religious
objections have allowed it when the child's health and safety would other-
wise be seriously endangered." A recent New Jersey decision 12 has ex-
tended this power to include the administration of transfusions to a pregnant
woman over her religious objections, where both her life and that of her
child were in grave danger without them. The court held that the child's
right to live, even before birth, 13 was superior to the mother's right to bodily
inviolability.
14
Although respondent was not pregnant, the court in the present case
attempted to apply parens patriae on the ground that since a court can
intercede when a mother neglects her child,15 it can also act to prevent the
"1 E.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Hoener v.
Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961); In re
Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933) ; Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d.
812 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1947).
The State of Washington appears to be an exception in holding that the state
has no right to intercede when parents are acting against the child's best interests.
but in good faith. See In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952); In re
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 123 P.2d 765 (1942). However, the Washington court
seems to have been faced only with situations where the recommended treatment
entailed a substantial risk, and it is not clear what would be done if such a risk
were not present.
District of Columbia statute law might limit the power in cases involving re-
ligious beliefs. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
12 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (NJ.
1964).
13 New Jersey had previously held that a child has prenatal rights. Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); accord, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp.
138 (D.D.C. 1946); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
14 It is possible that this case goes as far as the instant case itself, since trans-
fusions were given to the mother after delivery. Letter from H. Frank Carpentier,
Counsel for the Hospital, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, August 26,
1964, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. It is unclear
whether the court intended that its order be carried so far:
We have no difficulty in so deciding with respect to the infant child.
The more difficult question is whether an adult may be compelled to submit
to such medical procedures when necessary to save his life. Here we think
it is unnecessary to decide that question in broad terms because the welfare of
the child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be
impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them . . . . The blood
transfusions (including transfusions nade necessary by the delivery) may be
administered if necessary to save her life or the life of her child, as the
physician in charge at the time may determine.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J.
1964). (Emphasis added.)
15 See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960) ; State v. Sand-
ford, 99 Me. 441, 59 Atl. 597 (1905). See also note 11 supra.
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consummate neglect, abdication of life. 16 However, the refusal of respond-
ent's husband to authorize the transfusion indicates that he acceded to her
wishes even though they might result in leaving the child motherless. It
would not seem that one parent should be found guilty of child abandon-
ment 17 in a situation where the other parent has agreed to her leaving and,
presumably, to provide for the child alone.18
The second branch of parens patriae, the protection of incompetents,
would be applicable if, as the court intimates,' respondent was non compos
mentis at the time.2 0 But in light of the first amendment protection of
religious exercises, courts should use particular care in making such a de-
termination of fact. That an individual's choice is seemingly inconsistent
with the general mores of society should not, in itself, afford a basis for a
finding of non compos mentis. However, there is little more in the record
of the present case to support a finding that respondent was, in fact,
incompetent.?'
-16Instant case at 1008.
'7 See D.C. CODE AwN. § 22-903 (1961).
-8 See Lane v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (father not
guilty of child abandonment where mother led him reasonably to believe that sup-
port of the children was neither desired nor needed).
39 Instant case at 1008.
2o Even assuming that respondent was non compos inentis, a question may be
raised concerning the weight to be given the opinions held by her before becoming
incompetent. Normally, such opinions should be honored. See In re Church, 141
F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1956) (bonds bought by woman when competent with the
intention of saving them for her son cannot be sold by conservators after she be-
comes incompetent). However, the gravity of the decision to be made in the instant
case would probably support an exception to this general rule in light of the fact
that competent people will frequently change their opinions on familiar matters when
the consequences become immediate and fatal. See the discussion of "fear-rousing
appeals" in HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLY, COMMUNICATION A!ND PERSUASION: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL STUDIEs OF OPINION CHANGE 56 (1953).
The same logic would seem to prevent respondent's husband, as guardian, from
acting in defense of her wishes. His own beliefs would carry no more weight than
those of a parent refusing medical care for his child, since the state's powers are
identical in the two cases. See Kutzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808
(Dist Ct. App. 1950) ; State exr rel. Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382
(1889) ; In re Hilton's Estate, 72 Wyo. 389, 418, 265 P.2d 747, 759 (1954).
It is unclear whether the religious beliefs of respondent's husband would pro-
vide a defense in a manslaughter prosecution based on his failure to provide care
for an incompetent wife. See Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959)
(dictum) (religion no defense). Compare State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 Atl. 597
(1905), with State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904). The provisions
of D.C. CODE ANN. 6-119i (1961) might excuse the husband, as guardian, from
such liability in the District of Columbia. Absent religious considerations, how-
ever, it is clear that such action could result in criminal liabilty. See Jones v.
United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
21 In considering the fact that respondent had told him the transfusions were
against her will, the judge stated: "I was reluctant to press her because of the seri-
ousness of her condition and because I felt that to suggest repeatedly the imminence
of death without blood might place a strain on her religious convictions." Instant
case at 1007. This would indicate some capacity for understanding and decision
on the part of respondent. The court's most categorical opinion on the matter is
that, "Mrs. Jones was in extremis and hardly compos inentis at the time in ques-
tion . . . ." Id. at 1008.
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The court also justifies its action by inferring that an act such as re-
spondent's might be viewed as suicide and declaring the state's right to
prevent it.2 Erickson v. Dilgard 2 is apparently the only case involving a
factual situation identical to that of the present case. There the court
answered the hospital's contention that the patient's refusal was suicide by
saying:
[T]here is always the question of judgment involved as to
whether or not the medical decision is correct and . . . it seems
to me that the individual who is the subject of that decision has
the final say . . . in a system which gives the greatest possible
protection to the individual in furtherance of his own desires.24
Even if respondent's act should be viewed as attempted suicide, there
remains the question of the court's right to prevent it. If suicide is a crime,
it can be prevented in the normal exercise of the police power. However,
as the court in the present case recognized, "whether attempted suicide is a
crime is in doubt in some jurisdictions, including the District of Colum-
bia." 25 Few American jurisdictions have actually held it criminal.2 6
Others have either declared suicide noncriminal,27 or have avoided answer-
ing the question of its criminality.28
22 Id. at 1008.
23 No. 11974/62, Sup. Ct. Nassau County, N.Y., Oct. 1, 1962. The patient in
that case was suffering from upper gastrointestinal bleeding. After explaining to
him that without transfusions he "would die from loss of blood," and still being
refused permission, the hospital sought court authorization to administer them.
There was no question of the patient's competency, but death seemed certain without
transfusions.
24 Record, p. 17, No. 11974/62, Sup. Ct. Nassau County, N.Y., Oct. 1, 1962.
The idea that medical treatment can be forced on a person on the ground of pre-
venting suicide has been called "absurd." Wi.LIA s, CRiaSiN.AL LAw-THE GsNMAu
PART 733 n.7 (2d ed. 1961).
A second argument against viewing respondent's wishes, carried to fruition, as
suicide is that self-destruction, done for altruistic or noble purposes, cannot be called
suicide. Appealing though this argument may be, the better view seems to be that:
"For legal purposes, however, it is better to class such an act as suicide, while
admitting the fullest vioral-and perhaps legal-justification for it It would throw
legal terminology into confusion to assert that an act done from a good motive is
not done intentionally." W=rAms, op. cit. supra at 36. (Emphasis added.)
2S Instant case at 1009.
26 See McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); State v. Webb, 216
Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998 (1909); State v. Carney, 69 NJ.L. 478, 55 At. 44 (Sup.
Ct. 1903); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961); State v. Jones,
86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910).
27 See Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y.
1947); Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960) ; May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl. 885 (1906) ; State v. Sanders, 54 Tex.
Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908).
28 See, e.g., Rudolph v. United States ex rel. Stuart, 36 App. D.C. 379 (D.C.
Sup. Ct. 1911); Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 68 N.E. 492 (1903);
Sampson v. Ladies of Maccabees, 89 Neb. 64, 131 N.W. 1022 (1911); Ray v.
Leader Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 Tenn. App. 625, 292 S.W.2d 458 (1953); cf.
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Arguably, there exists a theory that suicide, while not criminal, is a
"grave public wrong." 29 But even assuming that this vague theory justi-
fies the prevention of suicide, the interest of the hospital as simply one
member of society, and thus one recipient of this general "wrong," does not
seem significant enough to give it standing to litigate.30 Furthermore, a
theory that the hospital, in its medical capacity, assumes a more significant
relationship to society and the individual in cases involving medical pro-
cedures would not seem to affect this lack of standing.3 1
In some states statutes make concessions to the personal and religious
freedom of the individual in medical matters. 2 The District of Columbia
Code grants the Commissioners of the District authority to require the
Silving, Suicide and Law, in SENEIDMAN & FARBEROW, CLUES TO SUICIDE 79, 91
(1957): "As shown by the fact that attempted suicide is a crime in only very few
states and that even in these states prosecution is rarely instituted, moral censure
of suicide today is not prevalent."
Several writers have taken the position that there is no societal right to in-
terfere with a competent individual's election to commit suicide. See, e.g., DUBLIN,
SUICIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL STUDY 149 (1963); FEDDEN, SUIcIDE
283 (1938); WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF Ln AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 293 (1957).
The sole reported decision dealing with suicide in the District of Columbia
is one discussing decedent's heirs' standing to collect his police death benefits upon
his suicide. The opinion views suicide as a wrongful act, disqualifying the heirs
from collecting, but does not label it a crime. Rudolph v. United States ex rel.
Stuart, supra.
2 9 This is the position taken by New York statute. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§2301; cf. Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y.
1947). But see Hundert v. Commercial Travellers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 244 App. Div.
459, 279 N.Y.S. 555 (1935).
Noncriminal suicide could be prevented on the grounds that the individual is
creating a public disturbance-dubious in the instant case-or is incompetent. See
WILLIAMS, TE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 290 (1957). To pre-
sume incompetency, however, would be improper, since many statistical studies indi-
cate that most individuals who commit suicide are not incompetent. See EAST,
MEDICAL ASPECr OF CRIME 167-68, 187 (1936) ; Carr, Suicide, in AMERICAN BOARD OF
LEGAL MEDICINE, INC., COLLECTED PAPERS 1956-1959, at 197 (1960). Indeed, the
legal presumption in cases involving suicide seems to be that the individual is legally
sane. See Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., supra; Royal Circle v. Achter-
rath, 204 Ill. 549, 68 N.E. 492 (1903). Of course, suicides are probably prevented
by the police even when attempted by sane persons in a manner not tending to
cause a public disturbance, but it seems that the question of the right to inter-
fere has never been litigated. Cf. CALVERT, THE CONSTABIE'S POCKET GUIDE TO
POWERS OF ARREST AND CHARGES 3 (1962).
30 Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (individual taxpayer
has no standing to challenge government spending from general resources).
31 Compare Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (medical profession gives
doctor no special standing to sue as guardian of women's lives in attempt to over-
turn statute prohibiting promulgation of birth control information).
32 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (1960) (right to practice faith healing
within certain limits), State v. Perricone, 37 NJ. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:14-64.2, -64.10 (Supp. 1963) (boards
of education may release those having religious objections from compulsory vac-
cination or immunization), Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d
394 (App. Div.), af'd, 31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
843 (1960); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3204 (religious belief excuses children from manda-
tory health or hygiene courses).
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reporting of certain malignant diseases, 3 but adds the caveat that nothing
in that section shall empower them to compel any person suffering from
such diseases to submit to examination or treatment.3 4 Although the Code
grants broader powers to the Commissioners with regard to communicable
diseases u and establishes jurisdiction in the courts both to make specific
orders for the treatment or quarantine of infected persons and to punish
those who refuse such treatment,36 these powers are qualified:
With respect to all persons who, either on behalf of them-
selves or their minor children or wards, rely in good faith upon
spiritual means or prayer in the free exercise of religion to prevent
or cure disease, nothing in [these sections] . . . shall have the
effect of requiring or giving the health officer or other person the
right to compel any such person, minor child or ward, to go to or
be confined in a hospital or other medical institution unless no
other place for quarantine of such person, minor child or ward
can be secured, nor to compel any such person, minor child or
ward to submit to any medical treatment
3 7
Thus, even in the one area where Congress has granted power to compel
submission to medical treatment, it has withheld this power from both
courts and Commissioners where it conflicts with religious freedom. At
least an equal degree 'of respect should attach to the wishes of an individual
with a noncommunicable disease 3 8
INCOME TAX-DBERsTEix APPLIED To APPELLATE liEw or
EDUCATIONAL ExPENsE DEDUCTIONS UNDER SECTION 162(a)
James Condit, an office manager and accountant, and Martin Welsh,
an internal revenue agent, each sought to deduct the cost of his night law
33 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1301 to -1303 (1961).
34 D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1303 (1961).
35 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-118 to-119 (1961).
36 D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-119h (1961).
37 D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-119i (1961). (Emphasis added.)
Although the statute was probably directed toward protecting the faith-healing
practices of groups such as the Christian Scientists, blood abstinence seems no less
the "exercise of religion" than does faith healing. To refuse its application in the
instant case would be to forbid practices of the Jehovah's Witness faith while tolerat-
ing identical practices by Christian Scientists, thus discriminating against the former.
381n the section applying to communicable diseases, Congress felt the necessity
of specifically granting the courts power to compel treatment. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-119h (1961). However, there is no such grant made with regard to noncom-
municable diseases, and, in fact, the section seems to deny such power. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-1303 (1961). An intent to withhold the power in the latter case
seems reasonable since communicable diseases create a danger to other members of
society not present in noncommunicable ailments.
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school education under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, which allows "as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness. . . ." The Commissioner disallowed the deductions in each case.
Welsh paid his additional assessment and brought suit for refund in the
United States district court, which decided in his favor,' while Condit took
his case to the Tax Court, where the Commissioner's position was sus-
tained.2 In neither case was there any substantial dispute as to the basic
facts. Each court based its decision on its interpretation of Treasury
Regulation 1.162-5, which declares educational expenses deductible as
"ordinary and necessary" expenses under section 162(a) if undertaken
primarily for the purpose of: (1) Maintaining or improving skills
required by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or
business, or (2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, im-
posed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary,
status or employment.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in separate per curiam opin-
ions, affirmed both on the same day, citing Commissioner v. Duberstein 4
for the proposition that a trial court's conclusion as to the "primary pur-
pose" of the taxpayer is a finding of fact and, as such, is binding on the
appellate court unless clearly erroneous. Welsh v. United States, 329
F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Condit v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 153 (6th
Cir. 1964).
The Duberstein case held that the question of whether a payment is to
be excluded from the gross income of the recipient as a gift, under the 1939
Code equivalent of present section 102 (a) ,5 depends on the "intent of the
payor" and that this is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact
based on that tribunal's "experience with the mainsprings of human con-
' Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
2 James J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962).
a Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958), 58 COLUJM L. REv. 1097. Congress impliedly
approved the regulation in § 96 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat.
1606, by extending the time for filing refund claims based on the regulation which
was promulgated shortly before the expiration of the normal filing period. Devereaux
v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1961); James E. Lane, 21 CCII Tax
Ct. Mem. 989, 991 (1962); 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN-CODE COM-
MENTARY § 162(a):3(b) (Zimet ed. 1964).
4363 U.S. 278 (1960). For discussion of Duberstein see Griswold, The Supreme
Court, 1959 Term--Foreword, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 88-91 (1960); Hauser, Business
Gifts and tMe Supreme Court, 38 TAXES 942 (1960) ; 46 CORNELL L.Q. 359 (1961);
39 N.C.L. REv. 286 (1961).
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b) (3), 53 Stat. 10 [hereinafter all sections cited
refer to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 unless otherwise indicated] : "Gross income does not
include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
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duct." 6 Such determination is to stand unless clearly erroneous.7  The
majority said that no more detailed standard could be laid down as a matter
of law.s8  Mr. Justice Frankfurter disagreed: "I do think that greater
explicitness is possible in isolating and emphasizing factors which militate
against a gift in particular situations." 9 He further stated: "What the
Court now does sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable ocean
of individual beliefs and experiences." 10 The situation presented by the
Welsh and Condit cases would seem to bear out this observation.
Welsh was the first case in which the cost of obtaining a law school
education was held deductible as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense." The district court did not find that the education was required
of the taxpayer or that it was customary in his line of work,'2 but rested
its decision solely on its finding that it was the subjective intent of the
taxpayer to maintain his position rather than to enter a new profession.'6
Objective facts were considered only in relation to the basic question of
subjective intent.
The propositions that intent is a question of fact 14 and that a finding
I Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
7 Id. at 291 (citing FFan. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
8 Id. at 289.
9 Id. at 295 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'D Id. at 297.
11 See 2 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 111360; Shaw, Education as an
Ordinary and Necessary Expetse in Carrying on a Trade or Business, 19 TAx L. REv.
1, 18-19 (1963); 11 LoYoLA L. Ray. 307 (1963); 17 U. MIAmi L. REv. 424 (1963);
13 U.S. TAx WEEK 483 (1964). Since Welsh, law school education expenses have
been held deductible in Fortney v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9489 (N.D. Tex.
1964) (IRS examiner); Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 420 (1964)
(CPA); Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (insurance claims
adjuster); William J. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963) (IRS exam-
iner); Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963) (civilian Air Force
employee). Unlike Welsh, none of these decisions is expressly based on the tax-
payer's subjective intent. Paradoxically, when their cases were tried, Condit was still
employed in his pre-law-school capacity while Welsh was a practicing attorney.
12Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
'a "The first sentence of paragraph (b) supra [of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5] intro-
duces the element of subjective intent into the question of whether the expenses are
deductible or not, and this was the basis on which the case was tried.' Id. at 599.
The first sentence of paragraph (b) reads:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are not deductible if
they are for education undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a
new position or substantial advancement in position, or primarily for the
purpose of fulfilling the general educational aspirations or other personal
purposes of the taxpayer.
Id. at 598.
14 Delineating the scope of appellate review by drawing a distinction between
"questions of law" and "questions of fact" often presents theoretical difficulties. See
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320
U.S. 489 (1943); Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1924); Brown, Fact and Law
in Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899 (1943); Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner:
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HAav. L. REv. 753 (1944). Compare state-
ment of House Judiciary Committee, 94 CoNG. REc. 8501 (1948) : "The distinction
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of fact is not to be upset on appeal unless clearly erroneous 15 are not open
to dispute. However, it is not clear that the appellate court was correct in
allowing the equation of primary purpose with subjective intent so as to
preclude any meaningful review. Although the plain meaning of the words
"primary purpose" might indicate a directive to focus judicial inquiry into
an examination of subjective intentions, such an interpretation would be
inconsistent with the accepted approach to the statutory standard of what
is "ordinary and necessary" in carrying on one's trade or business.
The determination of what is "ordinary and necessary" under section
162 (a) presents different problems from the determination of a "gift"
under section 102(a). The word "gift" is not a technical term, but is to be
construed in its colloquial sense, based on a factual inquiry into the state
of mind of the payor.1' Not so with ordinary and necessary. This phrase
carries a gloss of administrative and judicial interpretation to the effect that
the conclusion as to what is "ordinary and necessary" must be reached by a
broad yet objective inquiryY' An expense is generally considered "neces-
sary" if "appropriate and helpful." 18 Although the determination of what
is "ordinary" has given rise to considerable dispute, the various suggested
criteria pertain to the nature of the expenditure and its relationship to the
customary conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business, not to the state
of mind of the taxpayer. 19 All the criteria
may be said to rest, at least in part, on an underlying implication
. . . that whether an expenditure is "ordinary and necessary"
will depend upon a determination as to whether a hard-headed
businessman would have incurred it under like circumstances.
between questions of law and questions of fact is one well-established in the law,
and one with which lawyers and judges have long been familiar," with Professor
Brown's statement, Brown, supra at 900: "[W]e rather suspect that this seemingly
rigid dichotomy of law and fact is only a bit of legalistic mummery designed to con-
ceal from the uninitiated the fact that the courts decide these questions about as they
wish."
15 FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (cited in Duberstein).
16 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
17 Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 115 (1933) : "The standard set up by the statute [now § 162(a)] is not a rule
of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to
the riddle." Although this language is similar to that in Duberstein, see text accom-
panying note 6 supra, the Court in Welch went on to decide the issue as a matter
of law, rather than refer it back to the trier of fact.
1 Cf. Welch v. Helvering, supra note 17, at 113.
19 "It is the kind of transaction out of which the obligation arose and its
normalcy in the particular business which are crucial and controlling." Deputy v.
du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940); see 4 MmERNs, FEDERAl. INcOmE TAXATION
§ 25.09 (Zimet & Diamond rev. 1960). If, as Professor Wolfman suggests, "ordinary"
is only intended to distinguish current from capital expenditures, the inquiry remains
equally objective. See Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary"
Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. RFv. 1089, 1111-12 (1964).
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That person is the so-called average hard-headed businessman and
not necessarily the taxpayer himself.
20
The use of "primary purpose" in the regulation is unfortunate because of
its susceptibility to interpretation in the Welsh manner, making the deter-
mination of "ordinary and necessary" rest on the subjective intent of the
taxpayer. 2 '
Furthermore, intent is a more workable standard in the Duberstein
area of gift exclusion where, in the typical case, the intent of the payor, a
third party, is evidenced by several more or less objective criteria.22  As
the Duberstein Court observed: "[T]he donor's characterization of his
action is not determinative- . . . there must be an objective inquiry as
to whether what is called a gift amounts to it in reality." 23 However, if
the issue is to be the intent of the taxpayer himself in a unilateral under-
taking, the inquiry seems likely to dissolve into a more or less irrational
choice between conflicting bald assertions of intent, each case turning on
the trial court's view of the taxpayer's credibility. If the expenditure is
for education not reasonably adapted to the maintenance or improvement
of skills required by the taxpayer in his business or to meeting the re-
quirements of his employer, the deduction should be disallowed regardless
of the taxpayer's state of mind.
Although the Welsh and Condit cases are, of course, not identical in
every respect, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the same court
would not have decided one case for the taxpayer and the other for the
Government. In fact the Tax Court, in an opinion filed the same day as
204 MERsENs, FEDERAL I coai TAXA0ioN § 25.09, at 34 (Zimet & Diamond
rev. 1960).
2 1 In Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (per curiam), the Court
applied the Duberstein approach to a question of "primary purpose" under § 162(a).
An insurance agent had been given an all-expense-paid trip to a convention. The
district court had held that since pleasure was the primary purpose of the company
in offering the trip and of the taxpayer in taking it, the value was income to the
taxpayer, and the expenses were not deductible. 189 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
The court of appeals affirmed, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court, in
a per curiam opinion joined in by only four justices, dismissed certiorari as im-
providently granted, stating that "primary purpose" was a finding of fact that must
stand unless clearly erroneous. This case, like Duberstein, involved the intent of a
third party, which can be assessed by relatively objective criteria. Earlier, in
Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961),
the court reversed the district court's finding that the primary purpose of the tax-
payer was to conduct business on his trip, expressly considering the following
criteria: the time spent on personal as opposed to business activities, the fact that
all participants were co-employees, the fact that the convention was held at a resort
hotel, and the expressed attitude of the taxpayer's employer. Id. at 113-14.
22 E.g., the existence of a moral or legal obligation, how the payor treated the
item on his own return, the prospects of economic benefit to the payor, the existence
of an established practice of making similar payments, and, in the case of payments
to widows of corporation officers, the minutes or resolution of the directors meeting
at which the payment was approved. Control over these criteria was exercised in
Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
903 (1962), where the court reversed the tax court for relying solely on the resolu-
tion of the directors in a payments-to-widow situation.
2 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
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Condit 2 by the same judge, upheld the disallowance of a deduction for
law school expenses by a revenue agent under circumstances strikingly
similar to Welsh. If the only difference between the cases is that Welsh
was able to convince the court that in securing the education he was actu-
ated by the proper motives, whereas Condit was not so fortunate, it would
seem that a taxpayer in a similar situation would do well to pay his addi-
tional assessment and sue in the district court for a refund. This impetus
to "forum shopping" discriminates against the taxpayer who is unable to
pay an assessment 2 and is thus deprived of the choice of a forum which,
as evidenced by the present cases, may seem more sympathetic to his cause.
Furthermore, even if some courts tend to treat taxpayers more favorably,
the subjectivity of the standard makes it likely that some litigants whose
situations are identical will be taxed differently even in the same court.
Although the possibility of deduction as a reward to the successful litigant
may seem more sporting, the practical workability and equitable application
of the tax law demand a higher degree of uniformity. Therefore, the
uncritical extension of Duberstein's restriction of review to areas not
analytically akin to Duberstein should be avoided.
The Treasury has declared in Revenue Ruling 60-97: "In order to
satisfy any of these tests [under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5] . . . it is not
enough to assert or deny the purpose of the taxpayer in general terms.
Rather, it is necessary that the taxpayer show his purpose through specific
facts." 2 1 The applicable regulation,2 together with this revenue ruling,
provides a number of categories of intermediate findings into which inquiry
could be canalized in order to set some guide for the resolution of future
controversies and provide some more adequate basis of review than mere
acceptance of the trial court's conclusion on the ultimate factual-legal ques-
tion as a Duberstein-type finding of fact. For example: (a) What skills
are appropriate and helpful in the taxpayer's present position? (b) What
are the requirements of the employer or of applicable law or regulations?
(c) Are these requirements imposed for a bona fide business purpose?
2 4 James J. Engel, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
25 Congress sought to eliminate this discrimination when it amended § 1441 (a)
of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 164 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a)), in 1948
to make Tax Court decisions reviewable in the same manner and to the same extent
as nonjury district court decisions. 93 CONG. REc. A3279 (1947) (extension of
remarks of Representative Hobbs).
26 1960-1 Cum. BULl.. 69, 70. Example 10 of Rev. Rul. 60-97 is strikingly similar
to the facts of Condit and Welsh:
A trust officer in a bank undertakes to study law. The knowledge of
the law will be helpful in discharging his duties. His employer does not
require him to engage in such studies. He registers for the entire regular
curriculum leading to the bachelor of laws degree. Since the taxpayer is
pursuing a complete course of education in law which will lead toward
qualifying him in that field, in which he has not previously qualified, his
expenses for such education are considered to have been incurred for the
purpose of qualifying in that new field and are, therefore, not deductible.
Id. at 78.
2 ' Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
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(d) Did the taxpayer have knowledge of these requirements before assum-
ing his position? (e) What is the customary practice of other members of
the profession? 28 (f) Has the taxpayer met the minimum requirements
for qualification in his intended profession? (g) Does the education meet
the express requirements of a new profession, or of a new specialty or
position? - The facts of Condit and Welsh, if subjective intent were elim-
inated as a factor, would indicate identical answers to these intermediate
questions. A court should make some more significant stride in the direc-
tion of isolating and emphasizing those factors that militate for or against
deductibility,3" rather than write off this inconsistency as a necessary
concomitant of the license given the trier of fact under Duberstein.3'
TRADE REGULATION-FEDEAL TRADE CommissIoN PRE-
SCRIBES HEALTH WARNINGS FOR CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
In response to the report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon
General that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action," 1 the Federal
Trade Commission issued the Cigarette Advertising Trade Regulation
28The Internal Revenue Service has suggested that custom alone might be the
test for deductibility. See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERvic, TAX GUIDE FOR SMAIL
BUSINESSES 31 (1964). However, legal expenditures have been held deductible in
cases where there was no such finding. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962); Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964);
Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963). See 7 CCH 1964 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 118574. It would seem that an expense could be "ordinary and
necessary" without being customary. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467
(1943) ; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
29 In Welsh the Government contended that "the expenditure was, as a matter
of law, personal and nondeductible, since it served to provide the taxpayer with the
minimum requirements for entry into the legal profession." Brief for Appellant,
p. 10, Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964). Support for this
position is found in Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958): "In any event, if education
is required of the taxpayer in order to meet the minimum requirements for qualifi-
cation or establishment in his intended trade or business or specialty therein, the
expense of such education is personal in nature and therefore is not deductible."
See Example 10 of Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69, 78. However desirable
it may be in terms of uniformity and predictability, the adoption of the proposition
that the acquisition of a new skill is dispositive as a rule of law would not be con-
sistent with the accepted broad nature of the inquiry into what is "ordinary and
necessary."
30 Cf. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 295 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 "To overrate the function of the jury (or other trier of the facts) is to shirk
the function of the court, and to fail to administer justice rationally, consistently,
and soundly." Griswold, supra note 4, at 89 (criticizing Duberstein).
1 U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERvIcE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CommiTTEE TO THE
SURGEON GENERAL 33 (1964).
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Rule.2 The rule directed the entire industry to include a warning in all
its advertisements and labels that cigarette smoking is dangerous to health
and may cause death from cancer and other diseases. 3 Failure to display
such a statement, clearly and conspicuously, is designated "misleading ad-
vertisement," an "unfair and deceptive practice or act" under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 Trade Regulation Rule for Preven-
tion of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 5477 (1964).
The Commission claims a clear mandate to issue the present order in
the exercise of the power granted it by the Federal Trade Commission
2 Commissioner MacIntyre dissented, saying that the industry should be given a
chance to police itself. TRADE REG. REP. 1150238 (June 29, 1964). Maclntyre
argued that the industry had not been given adequate time to comply voluntarily
with the provisional set of rules issued by the Commission on January 22, 1964,
29 Fed. Reg. 530-32 (Jan. 22, 1964), pointing to the fact that the industry had estab-
lished a privately-enforced Cigarette Advertising Code. The present rule is a use
of a new regulatory procedure, the industry-wide trade regulation rule. Procedures
and Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. § 1.63 (Supp.
1963). Not yet resolved with regard to the new procedure are such questions
as reviewability, right to challenge the propriety of the rule in later litigation, and
the authority to promulgate the rules. Commission discussion of the legal effects
of the rule has not been clear. Compare FTC, TRADE REGULATION RULE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND LABELING OF CIGARETTES
IN RELATION TO THE HEALTH HAZARDS OF SMOKING AND AccOmPANYING STATEMENT
OF BASIS AND PURPOSE OF RULE 129 (1964) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT OF
PURPOSE), with id. at 145. By advocating a clearly advisory ruling rather than
the questionably binding one issued, Maclntyre's dissent focuses attention on the
problems of the present procedure. This comment will not deal with these issues.
The provisional rules which triggered the industry response provided as follows:
Rule 1: a specifically worded caution to be included in all future advertisements.
Rule 2: an order to eliminate all statements or implications that smoking is good
for the health, not a health hazard, or that one brand of cigarettes is less danger-
ous than another. Rule 3: a ban on the tar and nicotine derby (a term which has
come to mean the competition among companies to advertise that one has less
tar and nicotine than another). See 29 Fed. Reg. 530-32 (Jan. 22, 1964). Proposed
rule 3 was dropped because the Commission felt that the private industry code set
up in September 1955 to ban the tar and nicotine derby had been sufficiently effective.
Rule 2 was discarded in favor of rule 1, which was adopted in modified form.
3 Realizing the complex practical problems involved in adding insertions to all
advertising and labeling, the Commission put the effective date of the order at July 1,
1965, for advertising and January 1, 1965, for labeling. Complaints or exemption
hearings on the advertising order could be had until May 1, 1965. See 29 Fed. Reg.
8324 (July 2, 1964) ; TRADE REG. REP. 117939 (Sept. 15, 1964). At the behest of
Representative Oren Harris, chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, the Commission decided to delay the effective date of the labeling order
to permit time for congressional investigation and/or action. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1964, p. 19, col. 1. Many Congressmen have questioned the Commission's authority
to act and have introduced bills in Congress to specifically empower the Commission
to act as it has already acted. E.g., H.R. 3610, 4168, 5973, 7476, 9512, 9655, 9657,
9668, 9693, 9808, 11671, 11714, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The New York Times
and The Wall Street Journal speculated that, although the Commission did not
explicitly so state, it agreed to the delay because it too questions its authority.
N.Y. Times. Aug. 22, 1964, p. 19, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 1,
col. 3. In addition Dr. Luther Terry, Surgeon General of the United States, has
suggested that in the opinion of his Advisory Committee, the FTC Act should be
amended to give the Commission power to take the remedial action advocated by his
report. TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 55238 (June 29, 1964).
452 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
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Act 5 over trade practices," a term which by judicial definition encompasses
advertising.7 But both the words and the history of the statute belie the
Commission's contention. Under section 5(a) (6) the Commission is
empowered "to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from
using . . . deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 8 After an ad-
judicatory hearing, if a practice or act which the Commission has "reason
to believe [an advertiser] . . has been or is using" is found deceptive,
the Commission may order the offender to "cease and desist." 9
In enforcing this provision the Commission often orders deletion of a
false phrase '0 or elimination of a "false implication or overtone." 1 Less
commonly, it directs excision of an entire advertisement or trademark, or
an affirmative insertion, as in the present case.1 But, however exercised,
the Commission's scope of action has been circumscribed to permit only that
which is necesary to eradicate the deception. In cases involving orders
to excise a whole trademark, the Supreme Court has sanctioned only those
complete excisions required to cure the deceptive quality of the trademark. 13
Similarly, courts have distinguished affirmative disclosure "necessary" to
552 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1958), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(f) (Supp. III, 1962).
6 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 83-85.
7 Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d 661, 663 (6th Cir. 1958): "The use of advertising
is well recognized as an integral part of the production and distribution of goods,
and as such is subject to the regulatory powers of the Commission." Accord,
E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969
(1956); Reddi-Spred Corp. v. FTC, 229 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1956).
S Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a) (6), 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §45(a) (6) (1958).
9 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)
(1958).
10 See, e.g., Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 36 F.T.C. 563 (1943), aff'd, 150 F.2d
751 (3d Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 15
F.T.C. 657 (1931), rev'd, 64 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1932), rev'd, 291 U.S. 67 (1934);
FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 15 F.T.C. 38 (1931), rev'd, 58 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1931),
rev'd, 288 U.S. 212 (1933). The first two cases decided by the FTC were cases
of this kind: FTC v. A. Theo. Abbott & Co., 1 F.T.C. 16 (1916); FTC v. Circle
Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916) (textile products containing no silk were advertised
as "silk" or "cilk," and the Commission ordered these names deleted).
"See, e.g., Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); Aronberg v. FTC,
132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Wybrant Sys. Prod. Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1681 (1958),
aff'd, 266 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959); Proctor & Gamble
v. FTC, 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1926) (dictum). For a discussion of the various types
of deletion orders regarding false advertisements, see Barnes, False Advertising,
23 OHIO ST. L.J. 597, 646 (1962); Note, Federal Regulation of False Advertising,
5 BosToN COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND Co mERacl Ai L. REv. 704, 717-25 (1964).
12See e.g., Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964);
Haskelite Co. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942); Waltham Precision Instrument
Co., No. 6914, F.T.C., July 20, 1962, afftd, 327 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Ward Labs,
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1337 (1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827
(1960). On affirmative disclosures, see brief discussions in Millstein, The Federal
Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 439, 490 (1964);
Barnes, False Advertising, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 597, 645 (1962).
13 See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Royal
Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
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eliminate a false statement or implication of the advertisement itself, and
affirmative disclosure not "necessary" to dispel falsity, but informative to
the consumer. 14
In its use of the former, or "corrective" disclosure, the Commission
has acted cautiously and has generally been upheld by the courts. 15 In
such cases, the Commission functions positively by responding to a par-
ticular deceptive element in the advertisement itself. In this type of case,
the Commission's order is conditional: so long as the misrepresentation
continues, the affirmative disclosure must continue. For example, a scalp
treatment company that claimed it could cure "almost all" cases of baldness
did not reveal its actual ineffectiveness against the male pattern type. 16
The court upheld the Commission order that "failure to disclose that
approximately 95 per cent of the cases of baldness fall within the male
pattern type is plainly misleading, when the petitioners claim they treat
effectively virtually all cases of baldness." 17
On the other hand, Alberty v. FTC, the only case to consider the
question squarely, held the Commission lacked power to order an informa-
tive disclosure and described such authority as "the power to control the
marketing of all . . . products .. . ." 1I The Alberty court differen-
tiated the Commission's right to prescribe "corrective" disclosures from
power to order "informative" disclosure and, in reversing the FTC, con-
cluded that "Congress gave the Commission the full of the former but did
not give it the latter." 19 In this case a tonic manufacturer had claimed
that his product was able to cure fatigue caused by iron deficiency anemia.
The FTC did not deny this claim, but insisted that the manufacturer in-
clude in all future advertisements the information that iron deficiency
anemia was only a minor cause of fatigue, and, further, that his product
could not relieve fatigue from other causesY0 While such information
14 See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818
(1950). Affirmative disclosure cases are few, and affirmative disclosure discussions
fewer. Prior to 1950, the courts did not even question the few orders of this kind
which the Commission handed down. After 1950 the courts were awakened to the
Alberty distinction between informative and corrective disclosures, but discussion
was still scant. See, e.g., Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub
noin. Double Eagle Ref. Co. v. FTC, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Ward Labs, Inc., 55
F.T.C. 1337 (1959), af'd, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
'5 Millstein, supra note 12, at 490.
16 Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1840 (1959), enforced, 275
F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Trade Regulation Rule on Binoculars, TRADE
RaG. R P. 11 50273 (June 29, 1964).
17 275 F.2d at 23. (Emphasis added.)
18 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950). Although
Alberty was actually decided under § 15, the food and drug amendment of the FTC
Act, not under § 5, the Commission has broader corrective powers under § 15 than
under § 5, so the principles of Alberty should be applicable a fortiori to the present
problem.
'9 Id. at 39.
20 Id. at 37. See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. Ray. 1018,
1028 (1956), asserting that the conclusion of Alberty is due "to a recognition that
the primary function of the FTC is to prevent false and misleading claims rather
than to require informative disclosure."
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might be "interesting" and perhaps "useful" to the public, the court refused
to require the manufacturer to educate the public at his own expense.
The legislative history of the act supports the Alberty interpretation
of Commission power.2 ' When the Federal Trade Commission Act, de-
signed to maintain competitive conditions, was passed in 1914, the thought
of government regulating business in general by proscription was rela-
tively new,22 that of regulating by prescription yet unformed.23 Whereas
congressional discussion indicates that the power and discretion accorded
the Commission were to be broad, such power was not to take the form of
compulsory affirmative action designed to buttress competition. 24  The
agency that Senator Newlands, father of the FTC and floor manager of the
original bill, proposed to Congress was simply "an administrative tribunal
. . . with powers of recommendation, with powers of condemnation,
[and] with powers of correction." 25
In 1938 the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTC Act expanded the
Commission's power to cover all deceptive acts and practices in commerce,
including those having no effect on competition. 6 Although the prevailing
attitude was no longer hostile to positive governmental intervention,
2 7
21 See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1018 (1956).
See generally Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A
Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517-43 (1962).
22 "It must be remembered that this commission enters a new field of govern-
mental activity." H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1913).
23 See DimocK, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 402-23 (1949); MORISON & Com-
MAGER, THE GROWTr OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1865-1950, at 436 (4th ed. 1951).
See generally HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1942). The compro-
mise powers finally granted the Commission were confined to ordering business to
cease and desist from an unlawful practice. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MiND IN
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1865-1918, at 340-41 (1933).
24 Congress hesitated even to give the Commission the power to compel busi-
ness to carry out the correction which it recommended let alone to compel positive
reforms. See 51 CONG. REc. 8977 (1913) (remarks of Representative Murdock).
Interpreting this question of the Commission's power over remedy, the Supreme
Court declared that the Commission does not have unlimited choice as to remedy,
but rather is confined to that type of remedial action necessary to correct the evil.
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1946) (dictum) (excision of trade-
mark case).
25 47 CONG. REc. 1225 (1911) (remarks of Senator Newlands) ; accord, S. REP.
No. 597, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1914). Although phrased in terms of "compe-
tition" and "competitive conditions," congressional observations on the laissez faire
character of the Commission are here pertinent. Cf. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9
(1959). The "negative" attitude of Congress toward Commission intervention is
reflected in the Senate report on the bill: "[W]hat is meant when we use the phrase
'maintaining competition' is [only] maintaining competitive conditions ... "
S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1913).
26Federal Trade Commission Act §5(a)(6), 52 Stat. 111-12 (1938), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1958).
27Compare Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 552-53
(1935). In Schechter, the NIRA was struck down as an unconstitutional delega-
tion of congressional power. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Cardozo spe-
cifically described the nature of the codes which the NIRA was to promulgate;
"[A] code is not to be restricted to the elimination of business practices. . ..
It is to include whatever ordinances may be desirable or helpful for the well-being
or prosperity of the industry affected." Id. at 552. Such administrative action he
1964]
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Congress gave the FTC new power only "to the same extent [as] that
. . . over unfair methods of competition .. "..1, 28 The comments of
Senator Wolverton, a drafter of the amendment, indicate this intent: "The
bill . . . places no requirement on the advertiser to make any statement
concerning the commodity, but does require that he shall make no state-
ment that is misleading in a material respect." 29
The Commission contends that the present trade regulation rule is
corrective because it is necessary to offset the cumulative effect of adver-
tising claims that cigarettes are pleasure-, status-, and success-giving
and desirable3 0 The image of smoking conveyed by such advertising "is
inconsistent with and misrepresents the complete truth about smoking,
which is that while it may afford pleasure, it is a habit difficult to break
and extremely dangerous to life and health." 31 Furthermore, the Com-
mission asserts:
It is a prevalent view in our society that the Government
protects the public against advertisements to promote the sale of
dangerous products. The mere fact that advertisement of ciga-
described as "not merely negative, but positive. . . ." Id. at 553. Projecting the
possible application of such power, Cardozo declared that the "extension becomes as
wide as the field of industrial regulation." Id. at 553. Such power, he concluded,
is inappropriate to an administrative tribunal. Throughout the Court's opinion, the
FTC is contrasted with the unconstitutional NIRA.
Congressional intent to confine the FTC to a nonpositive role is also found in the
character of the procedural tool with which Congress equipped the Commission:
the cease and desist order. This order has been described as the administrative
equivalent of the judicial injunction. MAYERS, TE AmEaIcAw LEGAL SYSTEM 428
(rev. ed. 1964). In chara'cterizing the limit such procedure placed on the FTC,
Judge Ewin Davis, a former commissioner, said, "When the Commission issues the
cease-and-desist order, that is all it can do. We can just say 'stop'." 83 CONG. REc.
396 (1938) (read into record).
2883 CONG. REC. 3256 (1938) (remarks of Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a
drafter of the bill, on the Conference report on the bill).
29 83 CONG. REc. 396 (1938).
30 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 52. In the alternative the Commission claims the
power to order informative disclosures, on the basis of "the principle, established in
the interpretation and application of the Federal Trade Commission Act, that it is
unfair and deceptive trade practice to fail to disclose material facts concerning a
product which may influence many consumers in their decision whether to purchase
the product, particularly where the use of the product might endanger health and
safety." Notice of Labeling Rules, 29 Fed. Reg. 530-31 (Jan. 22, 1964). The Com-
mission retained this view in STATEMENT OF PmPOSE 106. In this respect the
instant order differs from a more recent trade regulation rule issued by the Com-
mission directing advertisers of previously used lubricating oil actively to represent
that the oil was previously used. In that rule the Commission explicitly stated that
such a statement must be added because the advertisements "represented directly or
by implication that such oil is new and unused, and . . . represented that such
oil has been 're-refined' when in fact the physical and chemical contaminants ac-
quired through use have not been removed by a refining process." 29 Fed. Reg.
11650 (Aug. 14, 1964). Further, the Commission noted, the packages for new and
previously used oil were identical. Since the order asserted that "substitution is un-
lawful, even if qualitative equivalence could be shown and the consumer is prejudiced
if he is led to expect one thing and is supplied with something else," the order itself
contained a finding which rendered the order corrective in nature. 29 Fed. Reg.
11650 (Aug. 14, 1964).
81 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 102.
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rettes is officially tolerated carries an implication that cigarettes
are not considered as serious a health threat as other products not
generally tolerated . . . .32
Thus, massive and skillful advertising has "blunted public awareness and
appreciation" 33 of the hazards of smoking, so that the advertisements
themselves must refute the public misconception.3 4
Even accepting the Commission's determination that the public now
carries a mistaken impression of the relation of smoking to health, the
order is not justified. For the representations that the Commission de-
scribes as misleading say only that the product is good,3 5 a representation
common to all advertising. Thus, if the Commission can here require
affirmative disclosure, it can require all advertising to disclose all defects.
Although the Commission attempts to distinguish the present case on the
ground that a health hazard has been clearly established by a governmental
report, neither does section 5 give nor does the Commission claim general
jurisdiction to protect the public from health hazards. The Commission
asserts that many people believe "the Governnent protects the public
against advertisements to promote the sale of dangerous products." 36 But
statutory mandate and not popular conception of what constitutes proper
Government action must delimit the scope of Commission power. Since
there is no deception, there can be no correction. Thus the present rule
is of the informative rather than the corrective-conditional type.
The Commission rejects the argument that the very fact of public and
governmental concern about the health hazards of smoking 3 7 differentiates
32Id. at 111.
33 Id. at 105. But see BORDEN, THE EcONOMIc EFFECrs OF ADVERTISING 222
(1942), in which the author listed advertising as sixth and last among the causes of
the great growth of the cigarette market.
34 The Commission noted that: "[T]he duty exists even if no individual advertise-
ment, viewed in isolation, is deceptive under conventional principles. . . . [T]he
duty arises precisely because of the tendency of the industry's advertising to neutralize
the impact of . . . educational efforts." STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 105. Such a
rationalization of a remedy is a curiosity in the annals of the FTC, for "to date, and
properly, the FTC has not adopted the view that advertising must always inform, or
always perform any specific function, although the subject has been debated, Alberty
v. FTC . . . ." Millstein, supra note 12, at 443 n.20; accord, Howrey, The Federal
Trade Commission: A Revolution of Responsibilities, 40 A.B.A.J. 113, 114 (1954).
35 See STATEMENT OF PuRPosE 102. The Commission's past actions in the field
of cigarette advertising have fit into the prohibitive pattern. See, e.g., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 56 F.T.C. 956 (1960) (consent order) (pictorial repre-
sentation of filter efficacy prohibited) ; American Tobacco Co., 47 F.T.C. 1393 (1951)
(prohibited representation that twice as many independent experts smoke Luckies
because of their knowledge of the grades of tobacco that American buys); R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 46 F.T.C. 706 (1950), modified, 192 F2d 535 (7th Cir. 1951),
order on remand, 48 F.T.C. 682 (1952) (prohibited representation that Camels aid
digestion, do not impair "wind" of athletes, will never harm or irritate the throat,
and are soothing to the nerves) ; London Tobacco Co., 36 F.T.C. 282 (1943) (pro-
hibited any words, pictures, or other representation that any domestic product is
imported).
3 6 STATEMENT OF PmPOSE 111.
37 American Medical Association Newsletter, Aug. 2, 1964, p. 1, col. 3. The
article reports that information on the hazards of cigarette smoking is being distributed
19641
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this case from ones in which the knowledge of the health hazard is
peculiarly within the control of the advertiser, that the implications of a
neutral advertisement, neither affirming nor denying a danger widely, if not
universally, known to the public are necessarily less "deceptive" than those
of a similar advertisement directed to an unsuspecting public. Since the
Commission does concede that there is more than ordinary concern, the
principle of Alberty applies a fortiori to cigarette advertising because
recent, continuing, and extensive publicity has certainly made the public
more cognizant of the connection between smoking and cancer than of the
connection between fatigue and iron deficiency anemia.
In the alternative the Commission contends that the present trade
regulation rule is "corrective" under the "standard of lawfulness [of section
15, relating to food, drugs, and cosmetics, which is] . . . fully applicable
in a Section 5 proceeding," 38 even though section 15 is technically in-
applicable to cigarettes. 39 That section prohibits false advertising of drugs,
food, and cosmetics "if the use of the commodity advertised may be in-
jurious to the health" 40 even when properly used. Moreover, in deter-
ming whether a drug advertisement is "false," the FTC is specifically
directed to consider "not only representations made . . . but also the
extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material with respect
to consequences which may result from the use of the commodity .... ,,41
But the rationale of section 15, with its broadened definition of "correc-
tive" disclosure, does not apply to cigarette advertisements. When section
15 was added to the FTC Act, congressional concern centered on consumer
purchase of worthless nostrums.4 Congress concluded that drugs claim
therapeutic value, and hence a failure to reveal deleterious effects con-
stitutes a misrepresentation. Accordingly, as to drugs, a Commission order
to reveal the deleterious attributes in effect constitutes a "corrective" dis-
closure. Cigarettes, by contrast, do not make positive therapeutic claims,
and consumers do not attribute remedial value to cigarettes. The one case
which considered the question, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. FTC,4
in the elementary and high schools throughout the country. Id. at 14. In addition
information is being disseminated via clinics. In New York City, for example,
therapy clinics are booming, and mass meetings are being held. Such publicity reaches
the very same people apparently influenced by cigarette advertisements. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
38 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 92.
3 9 STATEMENT OF PuRPosE 92 n.83.
40 Federal Trade Commission Act § 15(a) (1), 52 Stat. 114 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1958).
43 Ibid.
42 See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Kenney, a proponent of § 15: "[Diabetes
cures] . . . are sold only because of the false claims advertised for them. ...
[A] sufferer from diabetes will . . . rely on the false representations in the ad-
vertising . . . ." 83 CoNG. REc. 395 (1938).
43 108 F. Supp. 573 (1952), aff'd nere., 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
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held that cigarettes are not within the purview of the section.44 In that
case an advertisement affirmatively claimed that certain "'cigarettes can be
smoked by any smoker without inducing any adverse affect [sic] upon the
nose, throat and accessory organs of the smoker,' "45 but the court rebuffed
an attempt by the Commission to apply the corrective disclosure standards
of section 15. Considering that section 15 standards were held inapplicable
to cigarette advertisements making positive claims, it is difficult to deny
that they would be at least equally inapplicable to the present advertising,
in which the Commission did not find any such claim.
44 As times and conditions change it is fitting that an administrative agency,
before resorting to the legislature, should seek to invoke new means of coping
with still unsolved problems. But in its zeal the agency must not exceed
the bounds of its statute. The legislative history, such as it is, coupled with
indications of contemporaneous administrative interpretation leads me to the
conclusion that Congress, had the matter been considered, would not have
intended cigarettes to be included as an article [within the statute] . ...
Id. at 577.
45 d. at 573 (quoting paragraph 6 of Commission Complaint).
